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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Remittances are the portion of earned income that migrant workers choose to send 
to the families they have left behind.  Migrant workers may move to different regions in 
their own countries, or leave their countries of origin completely in order to earn more 
income.  This paper will only consider international remittances, the income that migrant 
workers who have left their home countries send back to their family members.  Over the 
past few years, remittances have begun to receive a great deal of attention, though people 
have been sending remittances for centuries.  There are several reasons why remittances 
are receiving so much attention now: (1) they are becoming progressively easier to track 
and record; (2) it is cheaper and safer to send remittances now, so people do not fear 
sending remittances through official channels; (3) remittances are a large source of 
income for many nations around the world.  For instance, in 1997, remittances accounted 
for 15.86% of Jamaica’s national income (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2004); (4) because 
of the expanding size of remittances, many policy makers and government officials desire 
to know how to use this income to develop their nations. 
It is very difficult to ascertain the actual growth rate of remittances for most 
nations.  The data available shows there has been a massive boom in remittance flows in 
the last two decades; however, these numbers could be misleading.  Perhaps this giant 
increase in the figures simply means that migrants and remittance recipients are using 
official legal channels and reporting their transfers more than before.  Haiti is an 
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excellent example of this “growth.”  Over the past twenty years, remittances to Haiti 
seemed to have multiplied by a factor of 8.  However, this growth in income is hard to 
sustain unless the number of Haiti migrants have also multiplied by that much.  Large 
remittances may point to a greater willingness of remitters and recipients to report or to 
send and receive the income through official channels. Though it is impossible to know 
the true growth of remittances, there is no doubt that remittances are flowing regularly 
and making a great impact on the recipient nations, as will be seen in Chapter III, the data 
description.  
What determines flow of remittances? Studies on this topic argue that remittances 
are determined by the income level of the host and the receiving country, the interest rate 
differentials in the two nations, and the black market and official exchange rate 
differentials (El-Sakka & McNabb 1999).  There are also other factors such as the length 
of stay of the migrant worker also impact remittance flows through official channels 
(Poirine 1997).  However, the biggest impact comes from the income differential (El-
Sakka & McNabb 1999).  Economists have offered four main hypotheses on the 
motivations behind sending family remittances to the country of origin: altruism, co-
insurance, implicit family loan, and self-interest (Poirine 1997; Chami et al 2003; El-
Sakka & McNabb 1999).  
A large number of researchers have studied remittances at the microeconomic 
level.  One such study is summarized in “Are International Remittances Altruism or 
Insurance? Evidence from Guyana Using Multiple-Migrant Households” (Agarwal & 
Horowitz, 2002).  There is another body of research examining remittances at the 
macroeconomic level.  Some examples are the El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) article, the 
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Chami et al article (2003), and Elbadawi and Rocha (1992). This study will use a 
macroeconomic approach to determine the behavior of remitters from Latin America. 
At the macro level, there are some researchers suggesting that political instability 
deters economic growth (Fosu, 2004).  One avenue that has not yet been fully or even 
casually explored by economists is whether remittances are affected by political 
instability.  David Fielding (2003) wrote an article on the effect that political instability 
had on investment and employment in Northern Ireland, a country that has been 
experiencing terrible political turmoil for several decades.  He found that political 
instability there reduced productivity, and therefore labor and investment due to attacks 
on property as well as the increased uncertainty about the returns to investment.  In fact, 
many other economists have discussed the impact of political instability on investment as 
well as labor, such as A.K. Fosu (2002, 2004).  This paper will make a first attempt at 
determining whether political instability in the receiving country has any effect on the 
flow of remittances. PolityIV is a measure of political stability. 
This thesis would help to further determine the behavior of remittances, i.e. 
whether they are subject to the same tendencies and shocks as other types of investments.  
If increasing political instability deters the amount of remittances a country receives, all 
other things being constant, then altruism might not be the true motivation behind 
remittances.  This thesis will test this relationship to see whether political instability 
negatively impacts remittances.  If it is true that some governments around the world are 
becoming dependent on remittance flows as a source of foreign exchange, it is important 
to know whether political instability will affect the inflow. 
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This thesis will do a macro-level analysis using aggregated data such as real per 
capita gross domestic product, real interest rates, and remittance flows.  The main source 
of data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators website.  The time 
period for the data is from 1970 to 2003.  The real GDP and interest rate data pertaining 
to 26 Sub-Saharan African nations as well as 21 Latin American and Caribbean nations 
will be used along with the real GDPs and interest rates from the U.S. and some 
European nations, which will be the host country data (see Appendix B for list of 
recipient countries).  Measures of political instability data come from the PolityIV 
dataset, which is available on the Internet from the Integrated Network for Societal 
Conflict Research Program (INSCR) in the Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland.  A panel estimation of the 
data will be carried out. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many economists have attempted to describe the trends in remittance flows; 
however, they diverged in many aspects: perspective (macro- or microeconomic), 
methodology, region of study (one country, one continent/region, or the globe), the four 
main motivations for sending remittances, and their findings.  The results are disparate 
and rather confusing, though the debate has continued for over thirty years, perhaps even 
to the time of John Maynard Keynes. 
In a 1999 article, M.I.T. El-Sakka and Robert McNabb attempted to find the 
macroeconomic determinants of remittances.  The authors desired to discover the 
macroeconomic determinants of remittances because remittances to developing nations 
are a major source of foreign currency, which is essential for economic development 
programs and stabilization policies.  Because governments attempt to harness the 
remittances into useful avenues for development it would be useful to know the key 
variables affecting remittances at the macroeconomic level.  They used aggregated data 
from Egypt from 1967 to 1991. The authors chose to study Egypt’s case because of its 
status as a major exporter of migrant workers during that period.  Remittance flows were 
a considerable source of foreign exchange; according to Wahba’s study (1991) 
remittances accounted for 41% of Egyptian exports of goods and services.  The Egyptian 
government had therefore made efforts to increase the remittance flows through formal 
channels by not taxing interest accrued on officially held deposits of foreign currency and 
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by issuing bonds in foreign exchange denominations to Egyptians living in other 
countries. 
The authors discussed the many ways that inflation could affect the flow of 
remittances.  High rates of inflation in the home country could cause increased migration 
due to the fact that real income would be unstable in the home country.  High rates of 
inflation would then cause migrant workers to remit more.  However, the authors also 
noted that if inflation depreciated the domestic currency, then there would be less 
pressure for migrants to remit more foreign currency.  This claim seems counterintuitive, 
since a depreciated currency would lead to decline in purchasing power.  Most 
importantly, some economists believe that high inflation is a substitute for uncertainty 
and risk, reducing the flow of remittances. 
El-Sakka and McNabb also stated that remittances might be dependent on the 
allocation decisions for investment projects.  If this is true, then the decision of how 
much to remit would be based on whether the domestic rates of return are or not 
competitive, i.e. if they are low compared to the host country’s then migrants will not 
remit.  In nations where there is a black market, the authors suggest that migrant workers 
will have to choose whether to remit through official channels or the black market based 
on the difference between the official and black market exchange rates.  Also, if 
remittances are to be taxed, then migrant workers will also send their earnings through 
unofficial channels. 
El-Sakka and McNabb estimated a model where flows of remittances were 
explained by migrant worker’s wages, level of domestic income, domestic price level, the 
domestic and world interest rates, and the official and black market exchange rates.  
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Other factors not measured in this estimation, such as changes in household size, 
education, and other factors are included in the error term. The average of the real per 
capita GDPs of the main Arab host countries was used as the wage available to migrant 
workers in Egypt.  The rate of return on foreign assets would be calculated as the average 
of interest rates in the receiving country.  The black market exchange rate was taken from 
Picks Currency Yearbook.  The other data were obtained from the Egyptian government. 
El-Sakka and McNabb estimated an Ordinary Least Square regression where the 
economic activity of the host country, as represented by the wages available to the 
migrant worker, has a positive and significant impact on the amount of remittances sent.  
The domestic GDP also positively affected the flow of remittances in both its current and 
lagged forms, but not significantly.   Both nations’ GDPs are important because host 
countries set limits on how many immigrants can enter the country based on the 
economic activity of the home country, and the amount of income migrant workers would 
be able to receive in the host country would determine how much the migrant workers 
would save for themselves and then choose to send home.  When the level of domestic 
income was dropped from the equation, the magnitude of the other variables increased, 
suggesting that Egyptians did not use remittances principally for consumption, but 
perhaps for purchasing assets instead.  Though the authors did not elaborate on this idea, 
perhaps they meant that the differentials for the variables tied closely to investment 
mattered more to remitters than Egypt’s income level, suggesting that the remitters were 
not sending money to be consumed, but to be invested.  
Remittance flows were discovered to be very sensitive to the difference between 
official and black market exchange rates in a negative way.  Migrants proved to transfer 
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their remittances through the black market, though there was risk attached, when the 
difference was large because of the additional return and due to the fact that a high black 
market interest rate is linked to erratic macroeconomic policy.  The difference between 
domestic and foreign interest rates also had a negative and significant impact on 
remittances sent through official means.  Migrants tended to save their money or invest it 
elsewhere when the domestic interest rate was too high.  The level of domestic inflation 
also had a significant and positive effect on the size of remittances, reflecting perhaps a 
desire to augment family income.  The authors used an autoregressive procedure to take 
into account serial correlation. 
The elasticity for the black market differential was large and significant.  The 
same was true for the interest rate differential.  These results implied that Egyptians were 
using their money for investment reasons.  The coefficient for domestic inflation was 
positive and significant, suggesting that migrants sent back more money during high 
inflation times, and that migrants are more likely to send their money through official 
channels in times of inflationary pressures in order to ensure that the money goes to 
where it was intended to go. 
These results imply that in the case of Egypt between 1967 and 1991, altruism 
and self-interest were both important motivations for remittances.  The results suggest 
that in order for governments to take advantage of remittances, the domestic interest and 
exchange rates must be competitive.  The inclusion of the black market variable indicates 
possible macroeconomic irregularities that must be ameliorated.  “Unrealistic” interest 
and exchange rates cause migrant workers not to send the money home, to divert it into 
the black market, or to invest it in what they believe will offer a higher return.  
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Mandatory plans that attempt to use remittance flows are found to cause migrants to send 
income through unofficial channels to escape legal actions.  The state must still try to 
utilize remittances for economic development through investment; however, new policies 
for remittances must work well with existing policies. 
In a 2003 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper titled “Are 
Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?” Ralph Chami, 
Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Janjah developed a model for the determinants and 
effects of remittance flows, including both microeconomic and macroeconomic variables. 
They noted that most of the literature on remittances focused either on the cause or the 
effects, or focused on either macroeconomic or microeconomic perspectives, but not all 
of them simultaneously.  They desired to create an easily modifiable model of 
remittances that incorporated both macroeconomic and microeconomic variables.  They 
did a panel estimation involving 113 countries from all over the world from 1970 to 
1998.  The authors concluded that remittances had a negative impact on economic growth 
and did not act as a source of capital for economic development. 
The authors made three basic assumptions: the motivation for remittances is 
altruism, and remittances are compensatory and counter-cyclical; family members who 
do not emigrate participate in the domestic labor market and the receipt of remittances 
affects the decision to work and therefore the amount of remittances needed; and there is 
a moral hazard because remitters are so far away from those receiving the remittances.  
The recipients may decide to work less because of the income from abroad.  
Consequently, remittances might promote negative economic growth. This argument 
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assumes that w/o remittances the receiving country would be able to generate 
employment and productive jobs for migrants. 
Chami et al (2003) used a mathematical model to show how output would 
decrease if remittances were received.  However, since the main concern of this thesis is 
not on output, this mathematical model is not described in detail.  Some important aspects 
of Chami’s model useful to this thesis is that the authors assumed that wages offered in 
the host country should be higher than those in the recipient country, echoing the research 
results of El-Sakka and McNabb (1999).  The authors posited that a migrant worker’s 
motivation for sending remittances was altruism.  This altruism would cause a migrant 
worker to send money home to maximize his utility by sending money to maximize the 
recipient’s utility.  Based on their derivations, Chami et al (2003) found that remittances 
are compensatory and they expected to find a negative relationship between the amount 
of remittances sent and the income level of the person receiving remittances. 
Chami et al utilized the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database to 
get data on remittances for 113 countries (African, Asian, and European) from 1970 to 
1998.  Although they had a large set of countries, many of the countries included did not 
have a large number of observations (less than 50 nations had more than 10 
observations), and the data was not continuous.  Most countries’ observations did not 
start until the mid 1980s.  The authors found their data on GDP per capita from the Penn 
World table.  The other economic data was taken from the World Economic Outlook. 
In their model, economic growth (measured by log of real GDP per capita) was 
explained via the initial value of real GDP per capita, investment (as GDP ratio), and 
ratio of remittances to GDP.  Another variable that the authors used is the ratio of net 
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private capital flows to GDP (npcf), which is a dummy variable, which is widely used in 
growth economic models to control for size of investment that comes from abroad.  The 
authors ran this regression and variations of it and found that there was a robust negative 
relationship between the growth rate of remittances and GDP per capita.  Another item of 
interest was that remittances to low growth nations were usually higher, and that high 
remittances within countries were linked to lower growth. 
The authors pointed out an endogeneity problem: the causes of remittances are 
also affected by remittances.  To address this problem, Chami et al. used an instrumental 
variable estimation where the growth rate of remittances was estimated as a function of 
instrumental variables (the real income differential between the host and recipient nation 
and the real interest rate differential), which had to be correlated to with remittance 
growth but not with the error term.  Remittances were estimated based on lagged 
measures of output where remittances are estimated via the differences in output levels 
between the host and the recipient countries and their corresponding interest rates).  They 
then used the growth rate of GDP per capita as a dependent variable, and fitted remittance 
growth rate as the independent variable. 
The authors found that remittances were compensatory, motivated by altruism, 
and counter-cyclical.  Remittances were not like private capital flows and were a 
reductive force for GDP.  The authors found that it would be very difficult to use 
remittances for economic development because of their nature as altruistic gifts rather 
than investments, or if remittances were considered a repayment of an implicit family 
loan.  Governments would have to persuade senders and recipients to invest rather than 
consume.  The moral hazard involved with remittances would also be another hurdle to 
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overcome.  Also, because remittances are a source of foreign exchange, losing these 
remittances would cause havoc with these countries’ exchange rates and their domestic 
economies as well.  Governments could end up depending too heavily on remittances as 
cushioning for bad economic times. 
The authors’ conclusions seem to in a way contradict the findings of El-Sakka and 
McNabb, who showed that remittances might be altruistic (for consumption) as well as 
self-serving (for investment).  This contradiction may be because Chami et al were 
studying an aggregate of 113 countries rather than just Egypt.  Another issue of concern 
is that the authors used the real GDP per capita of the U.S. as the income level in the host 
country.  This step is problematic because not all migrants in the 113 countries emigrate 
to the U.S.  Many go to host countries in their own regions, and these host countries will 
surely not have the same income level as the U.S. unless one considers some countries of 
Western Europe and Japan.  The two groups of economists did agree somewhat on the 
macroeconomic determinants of remittances.  Chami et al only excluded the real and 
black market exchange rates, but there is still a high goodness of fit (0.87).  Finally, the 
authors themselves admitted that all their theories about how moral hazard affects the 
recipient’s output, and therefore the migrant’s remittances, were just that - theories.  They 
have no empirical evidence to show that any of their mathematical manipulations have 
any basis. 
 
Research by many economists and political scientists shows that political 
instability is very important for economic performance.  As mentioned before, political 
instability can lead to a decrease in productivity, a decrease in the number of laborers, a 
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decline in investment, and therefore a depression of economic growth and development.  
Literature shows that the greatest factor affecting remittance flows is the differential 
between the income levels in the host and receiving countries (El-Sakka & McNabb, 
1999; Chami et al, 2003; Wahba, 1991).  There is a body of research that points out that 
political instability affects economic growth, and consequently the income level.  
However, the link between remittance flows and political instability has not been 
explored, though it would seem that logically, political instability would have some effect 
on remittances through a decrease in economic growth, if not also by other means.  The 
following articles discuss how political instability has affected economic growth in 
different regions of the world. 
 
Matthieu Bussière and Christian Mulder authored “Political Instability and 
Economic Vulnerability” in 2000.  In their article they tested whether political instability 
affects economic vulnerability in the case of the crises of Mexico in 1994 and Korea 
1997.  Mexico’s economic crisis came about after a presidential election, and Korea’s 
occurred before its elections. 
The number of coups was not included in this analysis under the belief that coups 
were no longer relevant given that these countries have elected governments.  They based 
this position on a previous study by Ul-Haque, Mark, and Mathieson’s 1998 study, which 
found that including variables such as assassinations, strikes or riots, government crises, 
or anti government manifestations were significant but did not contribute to the economic 
variables.  Bussière and Mulder chose countries that had similar, democratic processes: 
elections every four to six years and presidential or parliamentary governments.  They 
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constructed three political variables that measure political polarization (measured by 
effective number of parties and coalitions), cohesion, and volatility. They also controlled 
for election dates where governments attempt to cover up for important economic 
problems before elections.  All election dates had equal weight. 
 Bussière and Mulder tried to control for reverse causality by using data that was 
known at the beginning of both crisis periods.  In their model, the severity of the crisis is 
explained by the exchange rate level, the lending boom (percent increase in loans 
provided by the banking system over the past four years, which is a stand-in for the 
strength of the bank system), and reserves levels.  The assumption was that higher 
lending results in greater the number of bad loans.   
 According to their main findings, the effective number of parties and the number 
of coalitions were not significant, while volatility and election dates were highly 
significant.  The authors proposed that the number of political parties might not be a good 
substitute for polarization and that the number of parties in a coalition does not 
necessarily show the strength of a coalition.  The volatility index was significant and 
robust.  When included in the regression with all the other political variables it was 
significant at the 10% level, and its significance increased along with the R2 value when 
it was tested alone.  Volatility also passed tests for robustness.  The election variables 
also impacted economic stability significantly.  Two dummy variables were used for 
election periods.  The authors found that economic vulnerability increased after an 
election was held. 
 The authors found that the lending boom (the percent increase in loans provided 
by the banking system over the past four years) contributed more to the crisis than the 
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political volatility index did, and that political variables did not determine the extent of a 
crisis, but improved the explaining power of the regression when combined with 
economic variables.  Countries with solid economic fundamentals were not affected by 
election periods whereas countries that were not as sound, which the authors identified by 
high lending boom values, low reserves, and “overhauled exchange rates,” faced higher 
economic vulnerability.  The inclusion of political variables was therefore found to be 
very beneficial to explaining power of the regression.  The authors also found that the 
unstable period for nations is after elections, not before.  They found that holding an 
election led to a 40% increase in the crisis index. 
 
 In the 2003 article “The Political Economy of Growth in Latin America and East 
Asia: Some Empirical Evidence,” Ludovic Comeau, Jr. studied the history of Latin 
American and East Asian economic conditions along with their sociopolitical and 
institutional environments to determine whether a relationship exists between them and 
what kind of relationship it is.  Using the data from 1972 to 1989 in 13 Latin American 
countries (Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay) and 8 East Asian countries (Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), Comeau 
found that sociopolitical instability had a negative effect on economic growth. 
 Though their economic policies were very similar after the second World War 
with such strategies as import-substituting industrialization (ISI), which gave tax 
advantages and preferential appropriation of resources to domestic firms, the East Asian 
nations were able to move away from that ISI system and move to the export-lead growth 
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model, ensuring their GDP growth in the past decades.  The ISI was designed to protect 
the newly created firms in these developing nations; however, because these industries 
were shielded from competition from the global market, they became inefficient.  There 
were negative effects for exports as well, and the states that engaged in this behavior for a 
long period were unable to obtain their comparative advantage in the world market.  The 
effective way to use ISI was for a short period until the infant industries were out of their 
first development stages and then to remake policies so that these industries could 
compete in the world market.  East Asian countries made the change, while Latin 
American and African countries did not.  Comeau called this change at the opportune 
time “strategy switch-points.” 
Latin American and East Asian nations began to try to make policy reforms in the 
late 1950s that would decrease protection of domestic industries and increase the 
exportation of “nontraditional” goods.  The difference between the two regions was that 
Latin American countries still did not encourage exporting as much as East Asia, and 
there was a great deal of political instability, erratic policymaking, and lack of agreement 
in society about changing to a more open economy.  One main reason for this resistance 
to change was that labor unions were more influential in Latin America than in East Asia. 
The author found that East Asia was able to keep its macroeconomic conditions 
more stable than Latin America.  In East Asia, people were living better and income 
inequality decreased.  There was a high and rather constant rate of growth in productivity 
in manufacturing, and inflation of wages and process were for the most part controllable.  
Latin America, on the other hand had high inflation rates that shook confidence in 
business and Latin America nurtured the highest income inequality rates in the world.  
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All of these factors led to the failure of Latin American nations to successfully maneuver 
themselves through the strategy switch-point. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s were also events that caused Latin American 
economies to fare worse than they had before due to policy mistakes.  After the 1973 oil 
shock, East Asian nations brought about short-term policies to stabilize prices and to 
restrict the monetary supply.  These actions kept wages and real consumption stable, and 
spurred household saving.  Latin American nations did not try to stabilize their money 
supplies or price levels, leading to high inflation and deficits in the current accounts. 
 Comeau noted that it had been suggested that the reason East Asian nations were 
doing better than Latin American nations, though they both shared similar policy 
objectives in the 1970s and 1980s, is that East Asia lacked many natural resources and so 
was able to avoid Dutch disease effects.  Some economists offered differences in cultural 
heritage or traits up as a reason why East Asian nations have surpassed Latin American 
ones.  Others raised the fact that many Asian nations were offered foreign aid during the 
Cold War so they would not become communist as a reason for their success. This aid 
would have allowed them to develop faster, supposedly, than Latin America.  However, 
Comeau was dubious of these claims.  Dutch disease is a product not simply of having 
abundance of natural resources, but also of bad policies.  The cultural argument has been 
used as a both a positive and negative variable that would explain growth in Asia, so it is 
not a sound reason.  Lastly, the way aid money is implemented is just as important as the 
amount of money given. 
 Still more economists have tried to determine whether the type of government 
impacts economic growth, whether it is democracy or any other type.  Political stability 
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has also found a place in the literature for determining economic growth.  Some 
researchers find that it has little effect on economic growth while others find evidence of 
just the opposite.  Many economists have proposed that there are positive correlations 
between economic and political freedoms and economic growth.  Comeau, however, put 
forward the following view: that there is a nonlinear relationship between democracy and 
growth “whereby there is a relative erosion of the growth potential at high levels of 
political freedom,” and that political stability and “initial democratic capital” have a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
Unstable political conditions create uncertainty and cause investors to worry 
about whether they should invest their capital.  People cannot form rational expectations 
because of the unpredictable nature of the economy.  The cost of capital increases, and 
investors invest their capital in other more stable nations.  Workers also leave the country 
because of volatile social environments and because as investors leave the country, there 
is no longer as high a demand for labor.  The country then loses most of its skilled 
laborers, since they would be able to successfully integrate into another country with 
better living conditions.  Output would then decrease due to the drop in productivity, and 
because the workers that have left are usually the most educated, the nation cannot 
engage in research and development, leading to a drop in technological advances. 
Comeau used an augmented neoclassical growth model to show the impact of political 
economy on growth. Using data from 1972 to 1989, he estimates economic growth as 
determined by investment in physical capital, quality of labor input, the extent of 
sociopolitical instability, external debt the nation had as a percentage of GDP, region 
(measured by a dummy variable, taking the value of one for Latin American nations, and 
 19
0 for East Asian nations), inflation, government spending, and economic freedom.  Gastil 
created a measure of political instability, measuring how democratic the nation is in that 
particular year, it goes from 0 to 1, where 1 shows high instability and 0 is for low 
instability. Quality of labor input was measured as the percentage of the population that 
attained higher education – college or beyond (Barro and Lee 1993). The index of 
economic freedom, was taken for Gwartney et al 1996; this index goes from 1 to 10 
based on 17 criteria, 1 is the least democratic). 
On average, the Latin American nations studied were found to have higher mean 
and maximum values in terms of inflation, government size, debt, political rights, and 
political instability. Investment, economic freedom, and education, were higher in East 
Asia.  At the starting point, Latin American nations were better off than East Asian 
countries.  By the end of the period, the East Asians had outstripped the Latin American 
nations by a great deal. 
The results of the regression suggested that countries that experienced high 
instability would have a 1.34% lower average growth rate than politically stable 
countries, ceteris paribus.  The poor performance of the CONTINENT variable showed 
that though instability is important in affecting growth, being in one region does not 
affect the political stability of a country one way or the other.  Adding EDUCATION in 
linear and then quadratic form increased the explaining power of the model from 0.79 to 
0.86 (with EDUCATION) and then 0.89 (with EDUCATION2).  These results showed a 
nonlinear relationship between growth and human capital accumulation, and when 
CONTINENT was added to the equation at this point, it became significant and negatively 
impacted GDP growth. 
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East Asia’s GDP growth rate was almost 3% higher than Latin America’s.  
Growth in Latin America was shown to be lower than East Asia due to low levels of 
education and high levels of political instability.  Inflation and debt were also associated 
with low growth, and were found to be more powerful than political instability; as the 
model expanded the coefficient for UNSTABLE decreased.  Unstable countries had 
about 6% less investment than stable ones in this study.  Latin America as a whole had 
7.2% less investment than East Asia.  The authors remarked that most of the variables 
were linked to one another, so they checked for endogeneity problems.  The authors 
tested for endogeneity between political instability and external debt and found that there 
was no correlation between the two.  On the other hand, instability and inflation were 
found to be highly correlated and to “obstruct the momentum of the economy in a context 
of high foreign indebtedness.” 
The author found that instability is the byproduct of bad policies.  Policymakers in 
Latin America did not seem to a very good job at maintaining low inflation and debt, 
increasing economic freedoms, and increasing productivity through education, or human 
capital accumulation.  The ability to formulate and execute effective policies helped East 
Asian nations to achieve economic growth.  Political stability was another important 
factor in their growth. 
 
“Mapping Growth into Economic Development: Has Elite Political Instability 
Mattered in Sub-Saharan Africa?” was written by Augustin Fosu (2004).  He found that 
elite political instability negatively impacted the “mapping” of GDP growth into 
economic development.  He defined political instability as the incidents of coups d’état.  
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Economic growth was defined as GDP growth.  Economic development was defined as 
an improvement in the quality of life from Todaro (1994). 
For his study, Fosu used data from 29 Sub-Saharan African nations from 1970 to 
1985.  According to Fosu, there had been 60 successful coups, 70 abortive coups, and 
125 reported coups in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1958 and 1985.  The purpose of his 
study was to determine if these coups were harmful to economic development. 
The author uses an expanded growth model where economic growth is explained 
by h, which is human development, which includes health and adult literacy, and y is 
GDP.  The model was then expanded to h = a1 + a2y + u, with a1 as the intercept, a2 as 
the transformation of y into h, and u as the error term.  Fosu claimed that institutional 
features of a country affect h.  For example, a militaristic government or a dictatorship 
government could affect h.  In these systems, resources are more likely to be given to the 
elites, who will keep the leaders in power.  Fosu then used the following model to 
represent this relationship: a2 = t(p) = b1 + b2*p, where p measures the political 
instability an t is the coefficient of transformation.  The author then combined these 
models together to form this final model:  h = c1 + c2*y + c3py + c4p + v.  Variable c2 
replaces b1; c3 replaces b2; and c4 is the independent impact of p on h. 
Fosu used the change in the United Nations’ human development index (HDI) as 
a measure of h.  This index takes into account adult literacy, life expectancy, the log of 
the purchasing power of GDP per capita for each nation.  The lower limit of this index is 
0, i.e. when a nation has extreme “deprivation.”  Some economists have claimed that this 
index is redundant because all of the variables are significantly and positively correlated 
with the HDI.  However, Fosu argued that there was a lower degree of correlation for low 
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growth nations like those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The mean annual growth rate of GDP 
was used as a measure of y.  This data was taken from the World Bank.  Labor growth (l), 
gross domestic investment (k), and exports (x) were used as instrumental variables.  The 
data for these variables were also taken from the World Bank.  The variable p was the 
principal component of the frequencies of successful coups d’etat, abortive coups, and 
coup plots.  Fosu based his measurements on the 1986 McGowan study.  Fosu believed, 
however that different coups had different impacts on h.  He believed abortive coups had 
the biggest impact. 
The results of the regression showed that the largest impact occurred when the 
successful coup variable was used interactively with y.  The coefficient was negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  The goodness of fit was higher.  Successful coups were 
powerful agents in reducing the transformation of y into h, economy growth into 
economic development.  The greater the occurrence of successful coups, the larger the 
misallocation of resources to the elite to keep the new government in power.  Though 
economic growth had the biggest impact on economic or human development, a coup 
could decrease economic development by 10%. 
Fosu concluded that elite political instability slows the rate at which GDP growth 
is transformed into economic development.  Political instability also affected economic 
growth, and so there was an indirect effect of political instability on development.  Fosu 
proposed that a solution to elite political instability would therefore improve economic 
growth and development. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY & DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
This thesis will adopt the method used by El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) to test 
whether political instability has an effect on remittance flows.  The model will contain 
the real interest rates for the recipient and host countries as well as the real income per 
capita of the receiving and host nations and an index of political stability from the 
PolityIV dataset.  The black market and real exchange rates will not be used because they 
are more difficult to find than the other data.  It is suspected that the goodness of fit will 
increase for the model with political instability as an explanatory variable.  A panel 
estimation of 47 countries will be used to determine the relationship between remittances 
and political instability. 
The model that will be used follows: 
log remittances = a1 + a2 log (GDPh) + a3 log( GDPd) + a4 log(rd-rh)) + a5polity2. 
Remittances is real remittances per capita. The variables GDPh and GDPd stand for the 
host country’s real GDP per capita and the recipient country’s real GDP per capita, 
respectively.  The term (rd-rh) stands for the real interest rate differential between the 
receiving nation and the rest of the world.  The variable polity2 stands for the political 
stability index.  There will be some variations on this model.  Income and interest rate 
values will be lagged in some models.  The political instability variable will also be 
lagged in some models. 
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 Though endogeneity issues are a real concern in the model, they will not be 
addressed in this thesis.  The issue could be a topic for later research.  
It is expected that the sign for the estimate a2 will be positive, since an increase in 
the GDP per capita of the host country would imply that migrant workers would have 
more to remit (by also increasing migration to host country).  The sign of a3 is not easy to 
predict because it depends on the motivations for sending remittances, which is what this 
study indirectly tests for.  If the motivation for sending remittances is altruism or an 
implicit family loan, then it is expected that the sign for a3 will be negative so that as the 
income level in the receiving rises, migrant workers send less.  If the motivation for 
sending remittances is co-insurance or self-interest, then as income in the receiving 
country increases, remittances will actually increase.  The coefficient for the political 
instability variable is expected to be negative, but once again depends on the motivations 
for sending remittances. 
 
This study used aggregated data from 47 African, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries.  Eleven of these nations had discontinuous data.  There were countries for 
which the remittance data seems to be rounded up or down.  All 47 nations had at least 
ten observations over the 1970 to 2003 period.  Twenty-six African nations and 21 Latin 
American and Caribbean nations were represented in this study.  The remittance, income, 
and consumer price index, which was used to calculate the real interest rate, comes from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online web page.  The nominal interest 
rates were taken from International Finance Statistics. 
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Political stability was measured by using the Polity2 variable (from the PolityIV 
dataset) measuring the political behavior of each nation.  Polity2 ranks nations annually 
from –10 to 10 based on how democratic or autocratic they are.  However, in years when 
there are coups or other political interruptions, the PolityIV system gives the nation a 
number code based on whether it is under foreign domination, experiencing transition, or 
interregnum.  Polity2 changes these codes to regular polity values.  Polity data is 
available for all of the 47 countries from 1970 to 2003. 
 
 The following tables and graphs are meant to create a better, visual understanding 
of the amount of remittances received each year by each recipient nation and the 
economic impact of remittances on those economies.  All economic values are real 
values, not nominal.  The political instability of recipient nations is also described. 
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Table 1 Remittances by recipient Countries (1970-2003) 
Latin America and the Caribbean (in millions real U.S. $) 
 
Country # of observations sum mean std. dev. maximum minimum remit/rgdp
Argentina* 22 1510 68.64 61.22 253 15 0%
Belize 20 380 19.00 3.08 24 13 2%
Bolivia 28 875 31.25 47.36 135 1 1%
Brazil 29 27874 961.17 1056.41 3320 29 0%
Colombia 34 20189 593.79 745.82 3080 22 3%
Costa Rica 27 1689 62.56 87.94 321 2 2%
Dominican Republic 34 19828 583.18 689.74 2330 15 11%
Ecuador* 18 9815 516.58 573.87 1550 1 9%
El Salvador 28 18833 672.61 683.85 2120 11 15%
Guatemala* 26 8361 321.58 504.51 2150 1 10%
Guyana* 15 240 16.00 19.21 64 1 9%
Haiti 33 5799 175.73 207.02 811 18 21%
Honduras 30 4122 137.40 222.88 867 1 13%
Jamaica 28 11188 399.57 399.75 1400 69 17%
Mexico 25 106297 4251.88 3514.67 14600 177 2%
Nicaragua* 15 2390 159.33 155.79 439 4 10%
Panama 27 2391 88.56 25.85 136 16 1%
Paraguay 29 3202 110.41 110.87 299 6 3%
Peru 14 7422 530.14 242.74 860 87 1%
Trinidad & Tobago* 28 530 18.93 23.25 79 1 1%
Venezuela* 15 143 9.53 8.43 21 1 0%
 
* Indicates discontinuous data 
 
Table 1 partially describes the remittance flows to 21 Latin American and 
Caribbean nations considered in this study.  Sums of remittances over the years from 
1970 to 2003 have been calculated.  It should be no surprise that Mexico’s sum is the 
largest over $106 billion.  However, these sum figures can be misleading as some nations 
did not have all 34 years’ worth of data while some others started data inclusion at the 
end of 1970s or early 1980s, some nations are missing many years of data. Countries with 
discontinuous remittance data are marked above. 
Perhaps a better indicator of remittance flows to these nations is the mean of 
remittances over the 1970-2003 time period.  Mexico once again stands out as the leader 
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due, no doubt due to its very near proximity to the U.S.  Mexico’s mean remittance flow 
is, for example, ten times greater than Jamaica’s and Guatemala’s.  However, a note of 
caution should be provided as these are not per capita figures.  These figures are meant to 
give a better understanding of just how much money is being sent home by immigrant 
workers and indicative of the large number of workers living outside their original 
countries.  The standard deviation values for all of these nations’ remittance flows are 
quite large, perhaps showing just how much remittance flows have increased in the past 
three decades.  However, these fluctuations could be explained by other factors.  This 
thesis argues that part of this large increase in remittances is related to the political 
instability of the country. 
The last column in the table shows the portion of each nation’s real GDP that was 
due to remittances in the year 2003 only.  Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and the 
Dominican Republic all had rather high ratios of remittance flows to GDP (10% or 
more), showing how the economies of these countries were highly dependent on 
remittance flows.  The ratio of remittances to GDP in Argentina, Panama, and Brazil was 
very small, conversely.  These small values may have been due to misreporting, the 
distance these nations are away from the U.S., or the relatively large size of their 
economies. 
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Table 2 Data Description for Remittance-receiving Countries (1970-2003) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Country # of observations sum mean std. dev. maximum minimum remit/rgdp
Benin 30 2112 70.40 29.97 136 7 3%
Botswana 29 1576 54.34 18.95 94 26 0%
Burkina Faso 30 3028 100.93 43.94 192 36 2%
Cameroon 25 402 16.08 7.99 33 3 0%
Rep. Congo* 13 67 5.15 4.00 12 1 0%
Cote d'Ivoire* 28 1881 67.18 50.86 151 12 1%
Ethiopia 27 482 17.21 12.14 53 4 1%
The Gambia 29 396 13.66 10.62 40 1 9%
Ghana 25 393 15.72 17.48 65 1 1%
Guinea-Bissau* 11 60 5.45 6.68 18 1 9%
Kenya 34 5080.42 149.42 167.65 538 7.26 5%
Lesotho 29 8604 296.69 96.94 455 122 19%
Malawi 10 10 1.00 0.00 1 1 0%
Mali 29 2219 76.52 34.53 138 18 5%
Mauritius 10 1758 175.80 33.67 215 118 4%
Mozambique 24 1374 57.25 10.83 75 37 1%
Namibia 14 176 12.57 2.71 16 8 0%
Niger 30 292 9.73 3.68 18 4 0%
Nigeria 27 14518 537.70 697.69 1870 2 3%
Rwanda* 23 115 5.00 3.94 21 1 0%
Senegal 30 3867 128.90 86.84 344 9 7%
South Africa 34 3883 114.21 111.34 436 15 0%
Sudan 27 9053 335.30 303.80 1220 40 8%
Swaziland 30 1826 60.87 32.86 113 4 4%
Togo 30 698 23.27 25.15 103 4 7%
Zimbabwe 17 204 12.00 13.53 44 1 n/a
 
* Indicates discontinuous data 
 
 
Table 2 shows the remittance flows for the 26 Sub-Saharan African nations, 
showing a different pattern than the one seen in the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries.  First, the amount of remittances sent back by migrant workers appears smaller 
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the other region.  Nigeria’s total of remittances over the 34 
year period is the highest in the region; however, it is only 10% of what Mexico received 
in the same period according to the WDI data.  The other African nations in this study are 
nowhere close.  This pattern may be due to the fact that money sent to Sub-Saharan 
African countries is not sent through official channels.  This pattern could also possibly 
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highlight a difference in giving patterns between Latin American and Sub-Saharan 
African migrant workers. The standard deviation values for Sub-Saharan Africa seem 
lower than those for Latin America, signaling less fluctuation over time within each 
country.  This observation is actually quite surprising, considering all of political, health, 
religious, and cultural disasters of the last decades endured by Sub-Sahara countries.  Out 
of the 26 nations, only 10 have standard deviations higher than $100 million, whereas the 
Latin American and Caribbean region had 13 out of the 21 nations with standard 
deviations of over $100 million.  The ratios of remittances to GDP are over 10% for eight 
out of the 21 Latin America and the Caribbean countries; while in Sub-Saharan Africa 
only one country, Lesotho passed the 10% level. 
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Figure 1 Remittance Flows for Selected Countries (1970-2003) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the difference between the per-capita remittances sent to some 
Sub-Saharan African, Latin American, and Caribbean countries.  It is clear from this 
graph that in per capita terms, immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean are 
sending more money home through official means than those from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
An important qualification to make, however, is that these are the official numbers.  
Perhaps the systems to properly account for the income sent to Sub-Saharan Africa have 
not been developed to the extent that they have been in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Figure 2 Remittance Flows Per Capita vs. GDP Per Capita in 2003 
Selected Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the per capita remittance flows of four Latin American nations 
and Jamaica related to their own per capita economic growth rate. Unfortunately, there 
does not seem to be a pattern between the nations’ GDPs per capita and their per-capita 
remittance flows.  For example, Brazil’s GDP per capita was very close to Jamaica’s, but 
Jamaica’s remittances per capita were many times higher than Brazil’s. There are 
however, some countries showing a linear correlation between per-capita income and per-
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capita remittances, if we could draw a diagonal line from the origin in a 45o degree, 
countries like El Salvador, Dominican Republican, Nicaragua and Columbia would be 
very close to the line. 
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Figure 3 Remittance Flows Per Capita vs. GDP Per Capita in 2003 
Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows again the per capita remittance flows related to own per capita 
GDP of nine Sub-Saharan countries. The important information to take away from this 
graph is that remittances per capita for the African nations were a great deal lower 
compared to the Latin American and Caribbean nations.  The maximum remittances per 
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capita for Sub-Saharan Africa is less than $40, while in the Latin American graph, the 
highest was almost $600 per capita.  There are many factors that would influence this 
discrepancy.  Perhaps the most powerful factor is distance between the host and recipient 
country and the channels used by migrant workers sending remittances. 
 
Table 3 Democratic Index of 21 Latin American and Caribbean Nations (1970-2003) 
 
Country Average Polity2 Std. Dev.
Argentina 3 7
Bolivia 3 7
Brazil 2 7
Chile 1 7
Colombia 8 1
Costa Rica 10 0
Dominican Republic 4 4
Ecuador 5 6
El Salvador 3 4
Guatemala 1 5
Haiti -5 6
Honduras 4 3
Jamaica 10 0
Mexico 0 5
Nicaragua 0 7
Panama 0 8
Paraguay -2 7
Peru 2 6
Trinidad 9 1
Uruguay 3 8
Venezuela 8 1  
 
 
 
Table 3 shows some of the distributional characteristics of the Polity2 data.  
Polity2 measures the democracy degree of each country, higher positive values indicate 
more democratic societies. There was a large amount of variation within the region.  
Negative values for the average Polity2 variable indicate that the nation is not 
democratic.  Haiti and Paraguay were examples of this.  Others had highly democratic 
governments for the greater part of the 34 years, such as Venezuela, Trinidad, Costa Rica, 
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and, surprisingly, Colombia.  Most of the nations in this list have had a great deal of 
variation in the 34 year period.  Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Chile, Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Argentina were examples of those with large a great deal of change in their 
political environments over the time period of this study. 
 
Table 4 Democratic Index of 26 Sub-Saharan African Nations (1970-2003) 
 
Country Average Std. Dev.
Benin -2 6
Botswana 8 1
Burkina Faso -4 3
Cameroon -7 2
Republic of Congo -5 4
Ethiopia -4 4
Gambia 4 6
Ghana -2 5
Guinea-Bissau -4 5
Ivory Coast -7 4
Kenya -5 4
Lesotho -3 7
Malawi -4 7
Mali -2 6
Mauritius 10 0
Mozambique -3 7
Namibia -2 7
Niger -3 6
Nigeria -3 6
Rwanda -6 1
Senegal -1 4
South Africa 6 2
Sudan -5 4
Swaziland -9 3
Togo -5 2
Zimbabwe -1 5  
 
 
Table 4 shows a marked difference in the political environments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa from Latin America and the Caribbean.  Most of the nations listed above have an 
average Polity2 index that is negative, meaning that the governments were for the most 
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part very undemocratic.  The standard deviations are also high, showing that instability 
was high in the region. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MODEL ESTIMATION 
 
  The empirical analysis that follows is based on annual country data from 1970 to 
2003.  The data was taken from the World Development Indicators Online as well as 
International Financial Statistics.  The dependent variable for both regions (Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa) was remittances per capita in real 
U.S. dollars.  This was the value of all remittances that went to each country through 
official channels divided by the population of the country for each year. 
The income per capita disparity between recipient and host country was one of the 
control variables in explaining worker’s remittances. This thesis used two different host 
countries. The United States was used as a benchmark for Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries since most of their migrants went to the U.S. To choose one unique 
host country for the Sub-Saharan Africa was more complicated since it is farther away 
from the U.S. and because many of the countries still had economic ties to many of their 
former colonial rulers.  Using the GDP per capita of the U.S. would have been highly 
inaccurate as many African immigrants do not actually go to the U.S.  Consequently, data 
from “International Migration Trends: 1960-2005,” which was published by the UN was 
used to create a weighted average of the GDPs per capita of the nations that most African 
immigrants would go to (Population Division/DESA, 2005).  According to the 
publication, the U.S. accepted the most immigrants (35 million) in 2000, then Russia, 
Germany (7.5 million), Ukraine, India, France (6.5), Canada (6 million), and so on.  
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Russia, Ukraine, and India were immediately ruled out because of the language barrier.  
A weighted average of the GDPs per capita of the remaining countries was calculated 
based on how many immigrants they accepted per year starting in 2000.  The GDPs per 
capita of all nations was taken from the World Development Indicators Online. 
There were difficulties in obtaining interest rates from the WDI Online, i.e. there 
were many incomplete data, so the interests were retrieved from the International 
Financial Statistics.  The interest rate used was the discount rate.  The real interest rate 
was calculated using the consumer price index for each of the nations in each year.  
Though official and black market exchange rates were used in the El-Sakka and McNabb 
model of remittances, due to the difficulty of obtaining them for all of the nations 
included, the exchange rates were dropped from the model. 
The political stability data was taken from the PolityIV dataset, which was edited 
by Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers.  The Polity project is now the most widely used 
source for monitoring political regime changes.  It incorporates 161 countries, including 
all of the nations chosen for this study.  The PolityIV data series is an improvement on 
the last three because it introduces a new variable, polity2, which makes it easier for the 
polity regime measurements to be used in time-series analyses.  Polity2 can vary in value 
from -10 to 10 depending on the autocratic or democratic nature of the government, 
respectively.  A very negative score would mean that the government is an autocracy, 
which does not allow political competition and does not take care to give its citizens 
political rights.  A positive score indicates a relatively democratic government which 
allows for fair elections and political freedoms for its citizens.  The polity2 variable is the 
variable that will stand for political (in)stability in this model. 
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The equations for Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa were 
estimated by Panel Estimation.  The results are shown in Table 5 and Table 6, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5 Results of Panel Estimation of Macroeconomic and Political Determinants of Remittances to 
Latin America and the Caribbean (1970-2003) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Remittances per Capita
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -65.43 -67.58 -77.34 -79.31 -77.12
(-17.02)*** (-16.77)*** (-17.56)*** (-17.32)*** (-16.26)***
Log GDP per capita -1.79 - -0.39 - -
(Recipient) (-3.20)*** (-0.60)
Lagged Log GDP per capita - -1.97 - -0.63 -0.40
(Recipient) (-3.41)*** (-0.91) (-0.58)
Log GDP per capita 7.95 - 8.07 - -
(Host) (15.44)*** (14.36)***
Lagged Log GDP per capita - 8.30 - 8.45 8.04
(Host) (15.75)*** (14.13)*** (13.74)***
Log Interest Rate Differential -0.02 - -0.04 - -
(Recipient-Host) (-0.37) (-0.68)
Lagged Log Interest Rate Differential - -0.05 - -0.04 -0.04
(Recipient-Host) (-0.89) (-0.77) (-0.63)
Polity2 - - -0.05 -0.04 -
(Recipient) (-2.92)*** (-2.34)**
Lagged Polity2 - - - - -0.02
(Recipient) (-0.89)
Number of observations 273 261 252 240 240
Number of Countries 21 21 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.30
F-value 119.69 119.44 101.20 100.82 97.68
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0
 
Numbers in parentheses are the t-values for each variable 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Models 1 and 2 in Table 5 show the results of the panel estimation including only 
the macroeconomic determinants of remittances to Latin American and Caribbean 
nations.  The coefficient for the GDP per capita of the recipient country was negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which differs from the findings of other 
economists who have determined that remittances are not significantly affected by the 
GDP per capita of the receiving country (El-Sakka & McNabb, Chami et al).  Models 1 
and 2 show that an increase in the GDP per capita of the receiving nation has a depressive 
effect on remittances to Latin American and Caribbean nations, on average.  The 
coefficient for the GDP per capita of the host country, the U.S., is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, reinforcing what other economic researchers had 
found – that the wages available to an immigrant in the host country have a great impact 
on the amount he can send home.  The higher the earning possibilities, the more income 
is likely to be sent home.  The interest rate differential was also found to be statistically 
significant, as the previous literature on remittances showed.  Model 2 indicates that it 
may take some time for remitters to gauge the impact of changes in the economic 
conditions of both the host and recipient nations.  The coefficients for the income 
variable were higher in magnitude while continuing to be statistically significant.  The 
coefficient for the interest rate differential was positive and significant, though El-Sakka 
and McNabb found that it should be negative and significant.  This difference in direction 
of the size could come from the fact that two important variables (official and black 
market exchange rates) were excluded from the model.  The overall or adjusted R2 value 
was only 0.13 for both models, meaning that only 13 percent of the variation in 
remittances is accounted for by the variation in the independent variables; however, the F 
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values were very high for models 1 and 2, indicating that the results were statistically 
meaningful, and the coefficients were significant. 
Model 3 shows the result of the introduction of the Polity2 variable into the 
regression.  The coefficient of GDP per capita in the recipient country became smaller 
and not statistically significant.  The other economic independent variables remained 
statistically significant at the 1% level and became larger in magnitude.  The coefficient 
for the newly introduced Polity2 variable was negative and significant at the 1% level.  A 
unit increase in the Polity2 variable was shown to cause a 6% decrease in the amount of 
remittances sent to the receiving country.  A unit increase in the Polity2 variable would 
mean that the recipient nation is becoming more democratic.  This coefficient shows that 
as political conditions in the recipient nation improve, immigrants from that nation send 
less money home.  Therefore, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
remittances appear to be sent for altruistic purposes. 
Model 4 shows the result of lagging all of the independent variables.  The R2 
dropped slightly, and the number of observations decreased due to the lagging of the 
variables. The coefficients also changed, but only slightly.   The interest rate differential, 
GDP per capita in the host country, and the Polity2 variable remained statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
Model 5 explained the variation of remittances the best of all the models.  When 
GDP per capita and the interest differential of both the recipient and host countries were 
lagged, while the Polity2 variable remained in its present form, the size of the effect of 
GDP per capita for the host and polity2 increased.  This result implies that remitters make 
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judgments of what to give based on past economic conditions and real-time political 
conditions. 
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Table 6 Results of Panel Estimation of Macroeconomic and Political Determinants of Remittances to 
Sub-Saharan Africa (1970-2003) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Remittances per Capita
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -17.47 -22.18 -17.27 -22.31 -22.89
(-3.91)*** (-4.99)*** (-3.68)*** (-4.86)*** (-4.99)***
Log GDP per capita 0.14 - 0.14 - -
(Recipient) (0.36) (0.36)
Lagged Log GDP per capita - 0.61 - 0.61 0.60
(Recipient) (1.52) (1.51) (1.50)
Log GDP per capita 1.79 - 1.77 - -
(Host) (4.97)*** (4.57)***
Lagged Log GDP per capita - 1.97 - 1.99 2.05
(Host) (5.62)*** (5.32)*** (5.52)***
Log Interest Rate Differential 0.01 - 0.01 - -
(Recipient-Host) (0.14) (0.13)
Lagged Log Interest Rate Differential - -0.00 - -0.00 -0.00
(Recipient-Host) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.03)
Polity2 - - 0.00 -0.00 -
(Recipient) (0.14) (-0.11)
Lagged Polity2 - - - - -0.01
(Recipient) (-4.99)***
Number of observations 301 283 301 283 283
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.17
F-value 12.55 16.05 9.39 11.99 12.11
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0
 
Numbers in parentheses are the t-values for each coefficient. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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The panel estimation for the Sub-Saharan African nations shows different results 
from those of Latin America and the Caribbean.  The first two models show the effect 
that GDP per capita of the host and recipient nations and the interest rate differentials 
have on the flow of remittances.  Though all of the variables are significant in this model, 
as they were for Latin America and the Caribbean, the R2 value for Sub-Saharan Africa 
was a great deal smaller.  The F value, however, remained very high.  The coefficient for 
the GDP per capita for the host is almost five times higher in Latin America than it is for 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, the coefficient for the interest rate differential is three 
times higher for the Sub-Saharan African nations than for the Latin American and 
Caribbean nations, and it remains positive.  El-Sakka and McNabb point to the negative 
coefficient for the interest rate differential in their model as a sign that higher interest 
rates in the recipient nation deter remittance sending.  However, in the estimations for 
Latin America and the Caribbean as well as for Africa, the coefficient is positive.  This 
finding would suggest that on the whole, remitters are sending portions of their income 
for altruistic reasons.  Otherwise, high interest rates would discourage them, since they 
usually are synonymous with inflation and risk.  There are many reasons why these 
differences could exist.  The interest rates taken from the IFS database were a great deal 
higher for Sub-Saharan Africa than for Latin America, so the effect of interest rates 
would be higher.  The fact that a weighted average of the GDPs per capita of the U.S., 
Germany, France, and Canada was used deflated the income available to immigrants 
from Sub-Saharan Africa compared to those in the other group.  Lastly, the constant term 
in these two models is less negative than those in the Latin American models.  The 
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constant terms for Sub-Saharan Africa look more similar to those from El-Sakka and 
McNabb’s findings. 
When the Polity2 variable was added to the regression in Model 3, it was shown 
to be significant at the 5% level, but the size of the coefficient was only 0.02, meaning 
that a unit increase in Polity2 would only produce a 2% increase in remittances.  This 
finding nonetheless shows that there is a difference in the sending patterns of immigrants 
from Sub-Saharan Africa than from those from Latin America. 
When all of the independent variables were lagged in Model 4, the polity2 
variable became even smaller and not statistically significant.  The same was true for 
Model 5, where all of the independent variables were lagged except polity2.  So, Sub-
Saharan African immigrants as a whole do not take into account the economic and 
political conditions of the past to make their current judgments about remittances.  These 
results indicate that Sub-Saharan African immigrants may not consider political 
instability at all when deciding what portion of their income they should send home. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper, by adding the political stability variable, has shown that there are 
different patterns to remittance-sending by immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa 
compared to those from Latin America and the Caribbean.  It was determined that while 
an increase in democratic characteristics of government by a Latin American or 
Caribbean nation engendered a decrease in remittances sent home, the same increase in a 
Sub-Saharan African nation had no effect on remittance flows.  The results for Latin 
America and the Caribbean point to immigrants’ altruism as the reason for sending 
remittances, while the results for Sub-Saharan Africa are inconclusive. 
There were many problems with the data.  For many of the Sub-Saharan African 
nations, the remittance and GDP per capita data were missing for several years, if not 
entirely, so only twenty-six of the forty-eight Sub-Saharan African nations were used.  
The same was true for Latin America and the Caribbean, although to a much lesser 
extent.  Thus, a great deal of variation could have been excluded simply because the data 
was not collected.  This problem highlights another problem: there was a dearth in data 
collection in many of these African nations because of political unrest.  The Democratic 
Republic of Congo could not be included in this study, for example, because the civil war 
there had made data collection impossible for several years.  Eritrea, created out of a civil 
war in Ethiopia in 1993, also could not be included for lack of data.  The list continues.  
The reason that the results for Sub-Saharan Africa seem inconclusive may not be because 
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immigrants from there do not take political instability into account.  It could actually be 
that those nations that were not included would have had a large effect, but their 
exclusion caused these results. 
Another problem with the data is that the data available to graduate students may 
not be as much as the data available to professional researchers.  It was very difficult to 
find immigration data for the Sub-Saharan African region.  The author also did not have 
access to the real interest rates of all of the nations included, and so had to proceed with 
the estimations using the discount rates from the International Financial Statistics 
database.  Two very important independent variables (the official and black market 
exchange rates) had to be excluded.  All of these issues could have affected the regression 
results and their interpretation. 
Finally, the polity2 variable does not capture all instability.  The polity2 variable 
only reflects the changes that happen within the government, not necessarily the outside 
changes that could affect the government.  Colombia, for example, has one of the most 
stable polity2 averages out of the countries used in this study.  Nevertheless, no one 
would deny that there is instability in that country.  Political and criminal violence were 
not captured in this model.  Further research could be done in this area. 
The methodology of this paper also had some problems.  All remittance 
researchers point to the fact that exchange rates, interest rates, and income affect the flow 
of remittances.  However, they also acknowledge that remittances affect exchange rates 
and income.  Therefore there is a serious endogeneity problem.  However, that was not 
within the scope of this paper to solve.  The endogeneity problem could be the topic of 
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another paper, as no one to the author’s knowledge has actually definitively solved the 
problem. 
The inflation variable that was omitted from this model due to expectations of a 
multicollinearity problem was added in a follow-up panel estimation for the Latin 
American and Caribbean region.  The addition of the inflation variable changed the sign 
of the coefficient of the interest rate differential to negative, and the interest rate 
differential as well as the inflation were not statistically significant.  The coefficients for 
the real GDPs per capita and polity2 remained significant and comparable to those in the 
model used in this thesis.  When the simple model used by Chami et al (2003) was used 
to estimate remittance flows, the coefficient for the income differential was statistically 
significant, as it was in the Chami et al model.  The interest rate differential was not 
statistically significant, which echoed the Chami model as well.  Addition of the polity2 
variable caused a slight increase in the adjusted R2, and the polity2 variable was 
statistically significant and negative, just as it was in the model used in this thesis.  This 
model for the macroeconomic determinants of remittances had the highest R2 value of all 
models tested.  All of these different results from the different panel estimation models 
suggest that there are many ways to estimate remittances. 
This paper highlights an important issue for policymakers.  The results of this 
study contravene the results of the studies done by El-Sakka and McNabb as well as 
Chami et al when the interest rate differential is considered.  Instead of high interest rates 
deterring the flow of remittances into the recipient nations, they actually have a positive 
effect.  The results show that policymakers should not place too much emphasis on 
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keeping interest rates low, as far as remittances are concerned, although for the sake of 
GDP growth and economic stability, they should. 
Though this thesis has shown that remittances increase as nations become less 
democratic in Latin America and the Caribbean, the data and literature on political 
instability show that instability has a negative impact on the economy as a whole.  It is in 
the best interest of all nations to promote peaceful, stable, free, and democratic 
governmental environments to foster economic growth and welfare for their citizens. 
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